in a finite economy and the set of Nash equilibria in suitably defined non-cooperative games.
Introduction
The starting point of this survey is a pure exchange economy with finitely many commodities and with private ownership of the initial endowments. In such an economy it is often assumed that a Walrasian market gives the trading possibilities for the consumers. A Walrasian market is the institution given by a price system. All consumers take the prices of the commodities as parametrically given and choose an optimal action given these prices. The prices defining the Walrasian market are set such that aggregate demands equal aggregate supplies. Much of economic theory is devoted to analyzing economies with Walrasian markets or variants of this model.
However, considering an economy with a Walrasian market does not justify the Walrasian institution. How can it be justified that the trading possibilities for the agents are defined by a price system and that agents take the price system as parametrically given? Game theory has been extremely useful in the search for an answer to this question.
Concepts from cooperative as well as non-cooperative game theory have been used to introduce new equilibrium concepts into economics. These equilibrium notions do not rest on the assumption that agents take the prices of commodities as given. Thus, one has been able to ask the question, whether some of these other equilibrium notions lead to an equivalence result in the following sense: An allocation of the commodities to the agents in the economy is an equilibrium state according to this new equilibrium concept if and only if there exists a price system p such that the allocation is an equilibrium allocation corresponding to the Walrasian market defined by the price system p. If an equivalence result obtains we have an endogenous explanation of the Walrasian institution.
For most of the equilibrium concepts used in game theory there is no assumption paralleling the assumption that the agents take the Walrasian market as given a priori. Clearly, if prices are always set such that demands equal supplies, then in a finite economy any agent shall be able to influence the price system. However, the implicit assumption is that agents behave as if their actions have no affect on the price system. Clearly, one may think, that if the economy consists of many small agents who act independently, then this implicit assumption is approximately satisfied. Aumann (1964) defined a continuum economy in which the agents were modeled as [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure. In Aumann's model the assumption that an individual agent cannot influence the price system is endogenous and Aumann gave the first general equivalence theorem. He proves that an allocation can be obtained via a Walrasian market if and only if there is no group of consumers, which by using its own initial endowments can ensure that all its members are better of. This is Aumann's classical Core equivalence theorem.
Since Aumann's result, many other equivalence results have been obtained for economies with an atomless measure space of consumers. These results have very much
enlarged our understanding of the foundation for the Walrasian market institution.
Moreover, the attempts to analyze economies with infinitely many commodities have given new insights. Ostroy and Zame (1994) have pointed out that, when the commodity space is infinitely dimensional, an atomless measure space of agents is, in general, not enough to obtain results analogous with the equivalence results for economies with finitely many commodities.
Clearly, modeling the agents in an economy as an atomless measure space is an abstraction. Hence, a fundamental question is whether the equivalence results for atomless economies have analogies in economies with large, but finite numbers of agents. A strong result in this direction is the classical theorem by Debreu and Scarf (1963) . They showed that the Core and set of Walrasian allocations become arbitrarily close when a finite economy is replicated sufficiently many times. However, showed that if one considers more general sequences of finite economies, one cannot, in general, hope for such a strong conclusion. This leads to a weaker question. Namely, whether for some of the game theoretical solution concepts, one will have that any equilibrium allocation can be approximately decentralized by a Walrasian market in large finite economies.
Searching for equivalence results has a parallel in classical welfare economics. For a long time, it has been known that allocations obtained via a Walrasian market are Pareto efficient. However, starting with a Pareto efficient allocation, a transfer of initial endowments among the agents is necessary if the allocation has to be obtained from a Walrasian market. This is the content of the classical First and Second welfare theorems, see Debreu (1959) .
Notation and the Basic Model
For two vectors x, y ∈ , we use the notation y ≥ x if y h ≥ x h for all h = 1, ..., ; y > x if y h ≥ x h for all h = 1, ..., and y ≠ x; and y >> x if y h > x h for all h = 1, ..., . We let Δ = {p ∈ + | ∑ p h = 1} be the non-negative price simplex in . For a set S let |S| denote the number of elements in S. Z + denotes the non-negative integers. For x ∈ we let ||x|| denote the Euclidean norm of x.
We consider economies in which all consumers have the positive orthant + as consumption sets.
A preference relation on + is said to be continuous if the set {(x, y) ∈ + × + | y x} is open relative to + × + . The relation is irreflexive if x / x for all x ∈ + . It is monotonic if for all x, y ∈ + with y > x we have y x. A preference relation on + is said to be transitive-monotonic if z ≥ y and y x imply z x for all x, y, z ∈ + . We let mo P be the set of continuous, irreflexive, monotonic, and transitivemonotonic preference relations on + . A preference relation on + is complete if y
x or x y for all x, y ∈ + . The relation is transitive if z y and y x imply z x for all x, y, z ∈ + . We say that ∈ mo P is derived from the complete and transitive preference relation when y x if and only if y x and x y. We let A pure exchange economy with private ownership is a mapping E : (A, A , λ) →
A is a σ-field of subsets of A. λ is a finite non-negative measure on A . A is the set of consumers. An element S ∈ A is a coalition of consumers. A coalition S is said to be non-null if λ(S) > 0. We shall assume that the measure space is complete. Thus, all sets S ⊂ A for which there exists a null set T ∈ where S ⊂ T are again in . The vector e(a) is the initial endowment of consumer a and ∈ is consumer a's preference relation on . We assume that e : A → is an integrable function with . Furthermore, we assume that is measurable in the sense that for any measurable functions f, g : A → we have {a
Consider a consumer a in the economy and a consumption plan x ∈ . Then we define a's net trade as x − e(a). Since we have assumed that the consumers' consumption sets equal then the set of net trades which are individually feasible for a is − {e(a)}.
Definition 1
Let be an economy. An allocation for the coalition S is an integrable function x : S →. An attainable allocation x for the coalition S ∈ is an allocation for S such that x(a) ∈ for a.a. a ∈ A and .
An attainable allocation x is an allocation which is attainable for A. We let X() denote the allocations that are attainable in the economy .
Thus, an allocation x is attainable for the coalition S if S can ensure its members x(a), a ∈ S, by using its aggregate initial endowment .
An allocation x ∈ X( E ) is said to be individually rational if e(a) a / x(a) for a.a. a ∈ A.
Thus, an allocation x is individually rational if there is no coalition with positive measure such that all agents in the coalition prefer their initial endowments to the bundle they obtain by x. An allocation x ∈ X( E ) is said to be Pareto efficient if there does not exist y ∈ X( E ) such that y(a) a x(a) for a.a. a ∈ A. Thus an allocation x is Pareto efficient if it is impossible to distribute the total initial endowments in the 
Atomless Economies
An economy E : (A, A , λ) → + × mo P is called an atomless economy if (A, A , λ) is an atomless measure space. That is, for all S ∈ A with λ(S) > 0 there exists B ⊂ S, B ∈ A such that λ(B) > 0 and λ(S \ B) > 0. Hence, an economy is atomless if any non-null coalition can be split into two non-null coalitions. Clearly, if an economy is atomless then each individual agent is a null set and there is necessarily a more than countable number of agents in the economy. Atomless economies were introduced by Aumann (1964) as a way to formalize that the economy consists of many (a continuum of) small agents. Modeling a real world economy as an atomless economy makes it endogenous that agents individually have no influence on the set of attainable allocations for any coalition. If an allocation is attainable for S and a null set of agents changes their consumption plan, the new allocation is again attainable for S.
A useful tool in analyzing atomless economies is Lyapunov's Theorem as introduced into economics by Vind (1964) . Clearly, Lyapunov's Theorem implies that for an atomless economy E with consumers in (A, A , λ) and an integrable function
a. a ∈ A and f integrable} is convex.
Finite Economies
A finite economy is an economy E : (A, A , λ) → + × mo P where A is a finite set, A is all subsets of A, and λ is the counting measure, that is,
A useful tool in analyzing large finite economies is the Shapley-Folkman Theorem as introduced by Starr (1969) .
Theorem 2 (Shapley-Folkman) Note in particular, that the number of exceptional points, that is, points which are not in Z i , depends on the dimension of the Euclidean space but not on the number of sets in the family. The Shapley-Folkman Theorem is an approximate version of Lyapunov's Theorem. Consider for example the case where the sets Z i , i = 1, ..., n, are uniformly bounded. Then the Euclidean distance between the convex hull of the sum of the sets and the sum itself is bounded independently of the number of sets in the family.
Walrasian Equilibrium

Walrasian Allocations
We shall now define the set of allocations, which can be obtained by the Walrasian institution. That is, attainable allocations that can be obtained by letting each consumer independently choose an optimal net trade in a Walrasian market M(p) = {z ∈ | p · z ≤ 0}.
Definition 2
Let E be an economy. The pair (p, x) ∈ \{0} × X( E ) consisting of a price system and an attainable allocation is a Walrasian Equilibrium for E if [(i)]p(x(a) − e(a)) ≤ 0 for a.a. a ∈ A, y a x(a) ⇒ p(y − e(a)) > 0 a.a. a ∈ A.
A Walrasian allocation is an allocation x for which there exists a price system p such that (p, x) is a Walrasian Equilibrium. We let W( E ) denote the set of Walrasian allocations for the economy E .
In a Walrasian equilibrium all consumers take the Walrasian market M(p) = {z ∈ | p · z ≤ 0} with the price system p as given and choose net trades so as to maximize their preference relations. If the economy E is atomless then of course no agent will be able to manipulate the Walrasian price system. More precisely, assume that prices are set such that markets clear. Then the price system clears the markets independent of the action of an individual agent (and a null set of agents).
Strongly Fair Net Trades
An elementary characterization of a Walrasian allocation for a finite economy E is given in Schmeidler and Vind (1972) . 
Definition 3
Let E be a finite economy. The allocation x has strongly fair net trades if for all agents a ∈ A and all n b
The idea behind the concept of strongly fair net trades is the following: Each agent a considers the net trades obtained by the agents in A, that is the set Zx= {x(b) − e(b) ∈ | b ∈ A} of net trades revealed by x. If the institution leading to x is fair, then all the net trades in Z x should be available to any of the consumers. Hence, in equilibrium, none of the consumers should prefer any of these net trades to the net trade they themselves have obtained. (This equilibrium condition leads to the concept of allocations having fair net trades.) However, one might argue that an agent should also be able to obtain a net trade which is the sum of net trades revealed by x, and also any net trade which is a linear combination of such net trades with non-negative integer weights. An agent just uses the market possibilities repeatedly. In equilibrium no agent should prefer such a combination of the net trades revealed by x. This is exactly what the condition in the definition of strongly fair net trades says.
Clearly, any Walrasian allocation has strongly fair net trades. Schmeidler and Vind (1972) show that apart from indivisibilities, this condition also characterizes a Walrasian allocation in the following sense. Assume that X ⊂ is the marketed subset of the commodity space, that is, for any price system p ∈ the Walrasian market given X equals {z ∈ X | p · z ≤ 0}. Thus for any price system p the consumers cannot choose net trades in the whole of but only in the marketed space X. We can now define the set of Walrasian allocations relative to X. The definition of a Walrasian allocation above being the special case where X = . Vind and Schmeidler show that if the attainable allocation x has strongly fair net trades and reveals divisibility (for a precise definition see Schmeidler and Vind) then x is a Walrasian allocation relative to the smallest linear subspace of containing {(x(a) − e(a)) | a ∈ A} ∪ {c} for any c ∈ , c >> 0. In particular, if the dimension of smallest linear subspace containing {(x(a) − e(a)) | a ∈ A} has dimension − 1, then x is a Walrasian allocation.
The main insight used in the proof of Schmeidler and Vind's theorem is that when x is an attainable allocation, then the set
is a group. Clearly x Z is closed under addition and 0 ∈ x Z . To see that all z ∈ x Z have inverse elements in
A theorem corresponding to Schmeidler and Vind's also holds for an atomless economy E . Define for each attainable allocation x the net trade set
We now say that the allocation x has strongly fair net trades if, for no non-null coalition S, there exists an integrable function y : S → + such that 
